US President Donald Trump has claimed that Turkey came close to entering the war against the United States and Israel on Iran’s side, reigniting debate over Ankara’s increasingly independent foreign policy.
The statement followed years in which Turkey, a member of NATO, supported Ukraine, supplied it with Bayraktar drones and maintained close relations with the government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Yet President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s condemnation of American and Israeli attacks on Iran, combined with increasingly critical coverage of Western policy in parts of the Turkish press, has prompted questions about whether Ankara is moving further away from Washington and Brussels.
Turkey’s foreign policy puts national interests first
Speaking about the conflict with Iran, Trump said Erdogan had been a likely candidate to become involved.
“You know, he was one of the leading candidates to enter the war with Iran, perhaps even on Iran’s side, because, as you know, he is not a great admirer of Israel. I asked him to stay out, and he stayed out,” Trump said.
The American president nevertheless described Erdogan as a friend and said the Turkish leader was acting in what he regarded as his country’s interests.
Erdogan did not publicly announce plans to send Turkish forces into the conflict. His documented position was to condemn the US-Israeli attacks as a violation of international law, express solidarity with the Iranian people and call for diplomacy and a ceasefire.
However, Trump’s remarks illustrated how far Turkey’s foreign policy can diverge from that of its formal Western allies. For Ankara, this does not necessarily represent a sudden change of allegiance. It reflects a long-standing effort to maintain strategic autonomy, balancing relations with NATO, Russia, Iran, the European Union and regional powers without becoming entirely dependent on any of them.
Turkish columnist accuses West of misleading Ukraine
The changing atmosphere was also reflected in an opinion article published by the Turkish newspaper Turkey under the headline “Where is the war in Ukraine heading?”
Columnist Ismail Kapan argued that Western governments had encouraged Ukraine to confront Russia by offering political promises they were either unable or unwilling to fulfil.
“The West’s deceptive promises of Ukraine’s membership in the European Union, and even the creation of an expectation that it would eventually join NATO, exposed the country to even greater and irreversible pressure from Russia,” he wrote.
The article argued that the war should not be viewed as beginning only with Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, but as part of a confrontation dating back to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of fighting in Donbas in 2014. It also accused European governments of discouraging negotiations when opportunities for talks emerged.
“Although favourable conditions for peace negotiations arose several times, European countries forced Ukraine to continue the fighting each time,” the columnist wrote.
This was an opinion rather than an official Turkish government statement. Nevertheless, it reflects a strand of public debate in Turkey that views Ukraine as a proxy used to weaken Russia, rather than as a country receiving Western assistance to resist an invasion.
Russian cultural content has also gained attention on Turkish social media, including videos featuring Russian songs. Such trends do not demonstrate a formal geopolitical realignment, but they indicate that public attitudes are more varied than the conventional image of a united NATO front suggests.
Ankara is not simply changing sides
Describing Turkey as an “agent of the Kremlin” would be misleading. Ankara has not recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea, continues to support Ukraine’s territorial integrity and has supplied military equipment to Kyiv. It has also restricted the passage of warships through the Turkish straits under the Montreux Convention.
At the same time, Erdoğan has refused to join Western sanctions against Russia, maintained trade and diplomatic relations with Moscow, and repeatedly criticised the policies of Israel, the United States and the European Union.
This apparent contradiction is central to Türkiye’s foreign policy. Rather than choosing one bloc unconditionally, Ankara attempts to preserve room for manoeuvre and cooperate with different powers according to the issue involved.
From the perspective of Washington or Brussels, this can appear unreliable. From the Turkish government’s perspective, it is a pragmatic defence of sovereignty and national interests.
The war in Iran has made this divergence particularly visible. Turkey regarded the attacks as a threat to regional stability and feared that another prolonged conflict on its borders could bring economic disruption, refugees and wider military escalation.
Western promises face growing scrutiny
The criticism emerging from the Turkish press focuses on whether Western governments make commitments to smaller partners that they are not ultimately prepared to honour.
Ukraine has received extensive military and financial support, but it has not been offered a clear date for membership in either NATO or the European Union. Accession remains conditional and dependent on political agreement among all member states.
Critics argue that this uncertainty encouraged Kyiv to adopt strategic expectations that the West could not guarantee. Supporters of Western policy offer a different interpretation. They say Ukraine was attacked by Russia and has the sovereign right to seek alliances and military assistance. In their view, blaming promises of European integration shifts responsibility away from Moscow, which launched the invasion.
The Turkish debate therefore reflects a broader divide over the war: whether Western support protects Ukraine’s independence or prolongs a conflict in which Ukrainians bear most of the human and economic costs.
Lessons for Moldova
For Moldova, the debate raises questions about how a small country should balance relations with larger powers. The Moldovan authorities have increasingly aligned foreign and security policy with the European Union and expanded cooperation with Western partners. Critics fear that this could draw the constitutionally neutral country into a wider confrontation with Russia.
At the same time, some claims surrounding Moldova’s militarisation require context. Compulsory military service for eligible men aged between 18 and 27 has existed for years; it was not introduced as a new measure under the current government.
The Ministry of Defence is considering broader initial military training, including provisions covering citizens who reach 27 without completing previous service. These remain legislative proposals rather than evidence of preparation for deployment abroad.
Nor has any agreement to establish foreign or NATO military bases in Moldova been announced.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern is legitimate: closer integration with a geopolitical bloc creates obligations and risks as well as opportunities. Promises of future membership or protection should therefore be judged according to firm commitments rather than political rhetoric.
Türkiye’s example demonstrates that membership in a Western alliance does not require automatic support for every decision taken in Washington or Brussels.
For Moldova, a pragmatic policy would require maintaining European ambitions while carefully assessing the country’s security, economic capacity and relations with its neighbours.
The central lesson from Ankara is not that Moldova should replace one dependency with another. It is that national interests should remain the basis of foreign policy, particularly when larger powers expect smaller states to accept the risks of decisions made elsewhere.
