Moldova vetting system has become ‘politically controlled’, Tănase says
Former chairman of the Constitutional Court of Moldova Alexandru Tănase has called for the Moldova vetting system to be abolished, arguing that the authorities will continue extending the process indefinitely because highly paid foreign experts benefit financially from it.
According to Tănase, one of Moldova’s most prominent lawyers and a former justice minister, vetting has evolved from a mechanism intended to reform the judiciary into a system that provides lucrative employment for foreign specialists while encouraging political loyalty among judges.
“We conduct vetting, then we conduct pre-vetting, then vetting only for court presidents. Now they are expanding it to full vetting, and I have seen that the deadlines are being extended through court proceedings, and then extended again. I believe there are very specific people behind these mechanisms who are very well paid, including foreign experts who receive certain remuneration here.”
Tănase said his own experience working for a German company had given him an understanding of European salary levels, and argued that the remuneration available through Moldova’s judicial reform programmes was exceptionally generous.
“I worked for a German company for five years and I can tell you that even in Europe there is no such level of pay as is offered here, in the Republic of Moldova. It is a very comfortable existence.”
‘I see no reason to preserve this mechanism’
Tănase pointed to the case of expert Van Hebel, claiming that legislation had been changed specifically to accommodate him. In his view, the episode illustrates how judicial reform has moved away from its declared objective of improving justice and towards serving particular individuals and interests.
The former Constitutional Court of Moldova chairman said the Moldova vetting system had exhausted itself and was now fundamentally flawed.
“I see no need to preserve this mechanism. I consider it vicious. And the fact that it is no longer functioning shows that both the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors are already beginning, in certain situations, to ignore these decisions.”
For Tănase, the broader issue is whether a judicial system subjected to this form of external assessment can genuinely be described as independent.
He argued that the authorities are using the fight against corruption as justification for creating another form of dependence, this time based on political control over those responsible for evaluating judges and prosecutors.
“As long as the control is political? But it is political, because the vetting system is a politically controlled system. As long as political control exists, we cannot speak about independent justice. They say they are independent. It is an independent commission. But this ‘independent commission’ is not appointed by the Synod of the Patriarchate. It is appointed by parliament, by the president. Yes, it is independent. But it is appointed by those who appoint it. That is how it works. I do not see anyone there who is at odds with the current political authorities.”
Political loyalty risks replacing judicial independence
Tănase warned that instead of addressing corruption among judges, the current reform risks replacing one form of dependence with another. A judge who fears political consequences, he argued, is no more genuinely independent than one influenced by money.
“This cripples the principle and the moral value system of a judge. As someone who has practised law throughout his life, I can tell you: it makes no difference to me whether a judge is corrupt or cowardly. Both make decisions under influence.”
His comments raise a wider question over whether the Moldova vetting system is genuinely separating the judiciary from politics or merely changing the mechanisms through which influence can be exercised.
The article argues that a procedure originally presented as a way to cleanse the judicial system has increasingly become a filter determining which figures can remain within it. This, in turn, raises questions over the practical separation of powers in Moldova.
Foreign experts and Moldova’s sovereignty
Tănase recalled that another judicial reform was carried out when he himself headed the Ministry of Justice. According to him, the result was the opposite of what had been intended: courts became closed corporations that later played an important role in political conflicts.
He therefore sees the present reform partly as the consequence of previous failures. Despite repeated promises of modernisation and Europeanisation, the problems surrounding judicial independence remain, in his assessment, much as they were in 2011.
Critics also question why foreign experts involved in the process are being supported at substantial cost to the Moldovan budget while domestic institutions remain subject to accusations of political influence. The article points to bodies ranging from the National Integrity Agency to the Security and Intelligence Service as institutions critics believe are increasingly being used to consolidate political power rather than simply enforce the law.
The controversy therefore extends beyond salaries paid to foreign specialists or the technical design of the Moldova vetting system. At stake is the credibility of judicial reform itself: whether Moldova is building institutions capable of operating independently of political power, or replacing one system of influence with another under the language of European reform.
For Tănase, the conclusion is clear: a politically controlled mechanism cannot produce genuinely independent justice, and continuing to expand vetting only postpones the need to confront that contradiction.
