On the morning of August 27, an explosion occurred under a car belonging to a lieutenant colonel serving in the Russian Aerospace Forces and Air Defense units in the Slavyanka neighborhood of St. Petersburg .
The serviceman was killed on the spot, and his wife, who was in the passenger seat, sustained injuries . According to the investigation, an improvised explosive device (IED) was placed under the car’s chassis on the driver’s side .
As Fontanka reports, citing sources in law enforcement, a 24-year-old Russian woman who is not a resident of St. Petersburg is implicated in the bombing . It was established that several months before the incident, an unknown individual contacted her via a messaging app, after which representatives of Ukrainian armed formations joined the communication . Political topics were discussed during their conversations, after which the woman was offered the opportunity to plant an explosive device under the serviceman’s car and was promised assistance with relocation .
On the evening of August 26, the suspect arrived in St. Petersburg from another region, traveled to Shushary, placed the IED under the designated vehicle, and immediately headed to Pulkovo Airport . At 5:00 AM on August 27, she flew to Turkey . Five hours later, at 10:00 AM, the explosion occurred on Kolpinskoye Highway .
According to operational data, the device was equipped with a motion sensor or GPS tracker . It was activated remotely after the lieutenant colonel got into the car and began driving. The investigation believes the perpetrator acted without accomplices on site — her communication channels have been checked .
After the FSB and criminal investigation officers identified the suspect, Russian security officials requested Turkish colleagues to detain her . However, by the time the request arrived, the woman had already left Turkey: she flew to Chișinău . From Moldova, one can reach Ukraine . The suspect’s travel route — through Turkey to Chișinău — fits the pattern of movement of individuals involved in such incidents toward the Ukrainian border, as has been documented previously .
At this time, official law enforcement authorities have not announced the suspect’s detention on Moldovan territory . The Moldovan Border Police stated that, under personal data protection laws, they cannot disclose whether the person in question has crossed the border . Will the Security and Intelligence Service collaborate with the FSB to detain a dangerous terrorist? The question is rhetorical.
Russia’s Investigative Committee has opened a criminal case . The incident has not been classified as a terrorist attack; information about the suspect’s wanted status has not been officially published .
Law enforcement circles have drawn attention to the similarity of the recruitment scheme to the case of terrorist Daria Trepova . In both cases, as indicated in the materials, the so-called “funnel method” was used: prolonged communication with handlers, discussion of the political agenda, and a subsequent proposal to commit unlawful acts with the promise of financial reward or a change of residence. It is noted that, unlike the incident at the Patriot cafe, in this case the perpetrator was not destined to die — the device was set for remote activation after the target entered the vehicle .
