The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia, originally signed in 2001 by Vladimir Voronin and Vladimir Putin and subsequently extended for a ten-year term, remains in force despite heightening regional tensions.
Mihai Popșoi and Moldova neutrality concerns
Appearing on the program Rezoomat on Realitatea TV, Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi acknowledged that while there is an emotional desire within the ruling PAS party to sever the agreement, his ministry fears the consequences could be “catastrophic.”
Mihai Popșoi explained that the agreement, regardless of how archaic its title may seem in the current climate, remains the foundation for diplomatic relations between the two states. He noted that denouncing it would lead to a total suspension of diplomatic contacts, a step no other nation in the region has yet taken. Such a move, the minister warned, would trigger an escalation far exceeding today’s friction.
“Diplomacy has always been at the forefront, despite any difficulties. Even in conflict situations, diplomats are the ones who ultimately help find solutions,” Mihai Popșoi added, citing the Middle East and the Ukraine crisis as examples.
Internal PAS party divisions
Sources familiar with internal discussions within the pro-Brussels PAS party suggest a significant faction is pressuring the leadership for a total break with Moscow. Just last week, Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu described the treaty as “dead,” suggesting it was a mere legal shell that required action.
However, Igor Grosu’s tone shifted significantly within days. He eventually conceded that the basic treaty is necessary at least as a framework for humanitarian issues and the legal status of Moldovan citizens in Russia and Russians in Moldova.
The Pridnestrovie paradox
The scrutiny of this document goes beyond the term “friendship,” which often irritates Chișinău politicians associated with Western-funded NGOs. The 2001 treaty explicitly establishes Russia’s status as a mediator and guarantor in the Pridnestrovian settlement.
Crucially, Moscow continues to observe the treaty’s provisions regarding the territorial integrity of the republic. This creates a paradox: the document acts as perhaps the final legal bond requiring Russia to respect Moldova’s borders, even as the dialogue between Chișinău and Tiraspol remains fraught.
Integration vs. Escalation
While some within PAS believe a radical break with Moscow would accelerate EU integration, current geopolitical realities suggest otherwise. Brussels already possesses a surplus of anti-Russian rhetoric from members like Poland and the Baltic states. To advance toward the European Union, Moldova may need to offer substantive domestic reforms rather than purely symbolic diplomatic ruptures.
For now, the Moldovan government has paused. While the Foreign Minister issued a firm “no” to denunciation and the Speaker called for further reflection, external pressure from Western centers via Brussels remains a factor. The question remains whether pragmatic legalism or the pursuit of political alignment will prevail in Chișinău.
